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This is a review of the literature on the role of symptoms in family practice, with a focus on the
diagnostic approach in family medicine (FM). We found two, contrasting, approaches to reduc-
ing symptoms presented by patients in primary care, especially those which do not immediately
allow the definition of a disease-label diagnosis. Years of research into ‘medically unexplained
symptoms’ (MUS) has failed to support an international body of knowledge and cannot convinc-
ingly support the philosophy on which the reduction itself is based. This review supports the ap-
proach of researching reasons for encounter as they present to the family doctor, without
artificial mind–body metaphors. The medical model is shown to be an incomplete reduction
of FM, and the concept of MUS fails to improve this situation. A new model based on a substan-
tial paradigm shift is needed. That model should be the biopsychosocial model, reflected in the
philosophical concepts of the International Classification of Primary Care and the value of the pa-
tient’s ‘reason for encounter’. There is more to life than medicine may diagnose, and FM should
strive to move closer to the lives of our patients than the medical model alone could allow.
Keywords. Diagnosis, diagnostic process, family medicine, ICPC, International Classification of
Primary Care, medically unexplained symptoms, MUS, primary care, primary health care, reason
for encounter, reasons for encounter, symptoms, symptom diagnosis.
Introduction
This article is an outcome of background reading for
a research project on the epidemiology of family medi-
cine (FM) in patient populations.1,2 For that research
project, routine clinical practice data are collected with
the International Classification of Primary Care (ICPC)
using an electronic medical record within the Transition
Project.3–9 The research focussed on the content of the
process of diagnosis in FM in different populations.
Patients’ presenting symptoms/reasons for encounter
(RfEs) were core elements of the research to describe
the role and impact of the patients’ perspective on the
diagnostic process and on subsequent interventions.
However, a major conclusion of the project was that the
inclusion of routine data on patients’ RfEs adds consid-
erably to the power of FM data, including on the process
of diagnosis, but, unfortunately, that such data are rela-
tively sparse.1,2 In the process of this research study,
we performed a systematic review of the literature on
the role of symptoms/RfEs as they are presented by
the patient in FM, with a focus on the diagnostic pro-
cess. This review is presented below.
Literature review
Author IO performed a series of bibliographic searches
using Pubmed as the primary search engine on 1 March
2010. Details of these searches are given immediately
below. We included all English language papers pub-
lished before 1 March 2010, which described studies
which focussed on symptoms, or the RfE, or ‘medically
unexplained symptoms’ (MUS) in primary care, with
a perspective on the diagnostic approach to such symp-
toms/RfE/MUS. The retrieved papers were reviewed
by both authors. Papers were not excluded on the ba-
sis of, or indeed assessed against, quality criteria since
the aim of the review was to summarize the concep-
tual and theoretical framework of symptoms/RfE re-
search in primary care and especially FM rather than
to produce a quantitative summary of the outcomes of
such research.
The search for ‘symptoms’ and ‘primary care’ re-
turned 57 674 hits. From the titles, it became clear that
most articles dealt with symptoms in the broadest
sense: presenting symptoms but also (and even quite
often) symptoms and signs that appeared to exist
272
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/fam
pra/article-abstract/29/3/272/463315 by U
niversity of M
alta user on 02 August 2019
during examination and history taking. Limiting the
search to ‘patients’ presenting symptoms’ and ‘primary
care’ returned 2031 hits. An unexpected trend in these
papers was a growing body of literature that dealt with
MUS. In view of the obvious focus in these articles on
patients’ presenting symptoms, we decided to further
focus our review on this subject. At this preliminary
stage of the review, it became apparent that two broad
approaches to the patients’ presenting symptoms/RfE
exist in the literature: one which is exemplified by the
ICPC and which studies symptoms/RfEs as they pres-
ent in clinical practice and another exemplified in many
articles on MUS which categorizes presenting symp-
toms into two broad categories, medically ‘explained’
(implicitly) and ‘unexplained’.
The second search performed by IO searched for ar-
ticles that dealt with the role of the patient’s present-
ing symptoms/RfEs/MUS in the diagnostic process.
Firstly, the search for ‘reason for encounter’ and
‘primary care’ led to 57 results. The retrieved abstracts
were screened by IO for relevance. Forty-three ar-
ticles which discussed the concept of the RfE and/or
that collected or used RfE data were included in this
review.9–51 Of these, 14 elaborated on the RfE
concept,11,38–41,43–51 29 used ICPC as
a classification,9,10,13,14,18,23,25,27,28,30,33–51 and 7 origi-
nated from or were closely related to the Transition
Project, with which the two authors are closely
associated.13,23,27,41,44,50,51 Articles known to the au-
thors, or identified from cross-referencing from re-
trieved articles, which met the inclusion criteria were
also included in the review.6–8,52–55
Secondly, the search for ‘medically unexplained
symptoms’ and ‘primary care’ returned 141 hits. The
retrieved abstracts were screened by IO for relevance.
We excluded papers which focussed on the views and/
or training of primary care workers; or on outcomes,
interventions and/or therapy or on specific groups of
patients (e.g. the military, young children, people who
had been a victim of a disaster, pregnant women). This
process led to the inclusion of 49 articles.56–104
Authors IO and JKS reviewed all articles, without
exclusion on the basis of quality criteria. The authors
declare a bias in this field, having been involved in
longstanding research based on the use of ICPC.
Results
During this review, it became evident that the two
broad categories of publications reflect two different ap-
proaches to conceptualizing patients’ presenting symp-
toms and their relationship to the process of diagnosis
in FM.
ICPC advocates recording the patients’ complaints
as they are presented to the family doctor (FD). The
relationship between the patient’s RfE and the doctor’s
diagnosis may then be observed and described empiri-
cally. ICPC does not cater for mind–body metaphors,
and RfEs are not labelled as ‘physical’ or ‘psychologi-
cal.’ If a disease-label diagnostic label is not appropri-
ate, since the relevant diagnostic criteria are not met
ICPC recommends the use of the symptom itself as a di-
agnostic label.
MUS, as a paradigm, proposes the existence of a sub-
stantial proportion of patients that present, sometimes
over an extended period of time, with physical com-
plaints that are not attributable to a defined disease.
MUS conceptualizes such people as having a much
higher probability of suffering from underlying psycho-
logical/social/psychiatric problems. Essentially, if a symp-
tom does not lead to a diagnosis with a disease label,
then that symptom has no medical ‘explanation’ and
must be the result of somatization.
This review thus identified two contrasting diagnostic
approaches to patients’ presenting symptoms in FM.
These two approaches are discussed in detail below.
Where it all starts: the reason for the
doctor–patient encounter
An encounter in FM starts with a patient presenting
with one or more RfEs, either in the form of a symp-
tom or in the form of complaint (e.g. ‘headache’), a di-
agnosis (e.g. ‘diabetes’) or a request for an
intervention, such as a prescription, advice or a refer-
ral. The FD then formulates a most probable diagnosis
and performs one or more interventions (including
none other than ‘watchful waiting’) on that basis.3–5,7,8
This representation of the doctor–patient encounter
is widely accepted and is indeed an international stan-
dard approach.4,5,7,8 However, quite often not all these
elements are recorded in the patients’ medical record.
ICPC3–8 offers an accessible and practical solution for
recording all elements of the encounter, in that it pro-
vides a single terminology to describe patients’ RfEs,
the doctor’s diagnosi(e)s and the interventions that
take place.
ICPC also offers the advantage of enabling the FD
to use a symptom as a diagnostic label when no dis-
ease has (yet) been diagnosed, and, on the other hand,
to describe the patient’s RfE with a disease label when
a patient presents with such an RfE as ‘doctor, I came
for my migraine’. Using symptom diagnoses for prob-
lems which do not fit the diagnostic criteria for a more
specific disease-label diagnosis has many advantages,
not least of which is the accuracy of labelling of the
diagnosis.1,2,9
Moreover, the fact that documenting and coding
patients’ RfEs (and not only diagnoses and interven-
tions) with ICPC improves the quality of primary
care data has been amply argued and demonstrated,
most recently by the studies of Soler et al. in this issue.
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The RfE allows much richer understanding of what
is ‘going on’ in the consultation, both of the
perspective of the patient and of the process of
diagnosis.1,2,7–14,40,41,44,46–53,55 Nevertheless, this only
occurs quite rarely within international primary care,
and the diagnosis is often the only element of the en-
counter to be documented.1,2,6,8,9 The fact that such
data are often recorded on the basis of encounters
and not episodes of care,5 further complicates the in-
terpretation of such data since the evolution of the
problem over time is not captured and data accuracy
consequently suffers.1,2,9
In fact, this finding is rather surprising in the context
of ubiquitous pleas for patient-centred care. One
would have expected that formal attention for that
which patients verbally bring forward as their RfE
would rather have flourished since focussing on and
documentation of that RfE underscores the essential
role of the patient as an autonomous and competent
individual, who is not merely a person with or without
a disease. At the level of direct patient care, for an
FD to be able to provide adequate care, it should at
least be clear why a patient presents to the doctor and
what their expressed expectations are.
As evidently useful the concept of the RfE is for di-
rect patient care, RfE data also have great potential
for epidemiology. Comparative FM data from coun-
tries as different as the USA, Japan, Poland, Serbia,
Malta and the Netherlands have shown that similari-
ties between the databases were better reflected by
the way patients formulate their demands for care
than the diagnoses made by the FD.1,2,9,52
Additionally, studies that routinely document pa-
tients’ RfEs have made available extensive knowledge
about the prior and posterior probabilities of a diagnosis,
when a patient from a certain sex/age group presents
with a specific symptom or complaint. The likelihood
ratio of an RfE for a defined diagnosis is at the core of
evidence-based decision making. The likelihood ratio
updates the prior (pre-test) probability, to give a poste-
rior (post-test) probability of a diagnosis being present,
given a RfE.1–3,6–8,55 Within the broad array of conten-
tions concerning the competences required of FDs,
there is general agreement on the importance of esti-
mating the probability of disease in unselected pa-
tients.105,106 Such data are especially important for
medical education and decision support.1,2,55
As opposed to other medical specialties, FDs do
not see a selected population but deal with people
with a broad range of health problems in different
stages of development. FDs work in a context of un-
certainty, more so than other medical specialists, also
since they often deal with fuzzy data in a complex
health care world. A substantial proportion of the
medical history of their patients is not readily avail-
able to be documented before the encounter starts
but is, to a large extent, constituted during the
encounter as a result of the interaction between doc-
tor and patient. This is consequently a major reason to
identify, classify and code patients’ RfEs, in order to
document this complex process in its entirety. Only
then would the record of the encounter be accurate
and complete.
The RfE is not only a core element of the process of
making the diagnosis but also strongly influences the
interventions that subsequently occur.2,3,8,27,55,105,107
For some health problems, the relationship between
the nature of the diagnosis and the subsequent inter-
ventions is strongly influenced by the problem itself,
such as in the case of excessive earwax, an ankle
sprain or a foreign body in the eye. Quite often, how-
ever, the nature of an intervention cannot be explained
by the diagnosis alone. For example, in dealing with
patients who have relationship issues or feelings of
sadness and depression, FDs act differently in individ-
ual cases, depending on the specific requests and prior-
ities of the individual patient.3,27 Consequently, ICPC
also includes codes for RfEs in the form of a patient
request (for a prescription, advice, an X-ray, a certifi-
cate). Table 1 presents data from the Transition pro-
ject in the Netherlands concerning eight frequent
interventions. It shows that if patients ask for a specific
intervention, FDs meet their request more than half of
the time (mean 56%, range 45%–79%).3 However, the
converse does not hold, and when one looks at all the
FDs’ interventions (last column), these actions follow
or result from a patient’s prior explicit request in a
minority of cases (mean 15%, range 6%–26%).3 Per-
forming, or not performing, a defined intervention
is evidently influenced by both the patient and the
FD, and it is the influence of the RfE that explains dif-
ferences in professional behaviour in episodes of the
same diagnosis to a substantial degree. Therefore, de-
scribing and understanding the content of FM requires
insight not only into diagnoses and interventions but
also into patients’ RfEs.
The symptom diagnosis
An essential characteristic of FM, reflected in ICPC, is
the availability of the category of symptom diagno-
ses.1–5,8,13,27 Often, FDs deal with health problems at
the earliest stages of development, at high levels of di-
agnostic uncertainty. Consequently, there is often no
better diagnostic label other than the presented symp-
tom itself, especially at the start of an episode of care
in FM.1–5,8,13,27,55
If a patient presents with, for example, ‘stomach pain’
at the start of a new episode of care, it may well be that
the FD cannot decide on a more specific diagnosis, with
any certainty, other than the fact that the patient suffers
from stomach pain, pending further investigation. Using
a symptom diagnosis echoing the RfE, rather than
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a ‘tentative’ or ‘preliminary’ disease diagnosis such as
‘biliary colic’, ‘gastritis’ or ‘peptic ulcer’ has the advan-
tage of precision at a lower level of specificity, both for
direct patient care and for epidemiology.
The certainty of the diagnosis and the accuracy of the
diagnostic label are thus improved by using a symptom
diagnosis when appropriate. In fact, the utilization of
a disease-label diagnosis in cases where the criteria are
not met could be criticized as unscientific or at the very
least epidemiologically imprecise. From an epidemio-
logical point of view, the availability of a symptom di-
agnosis allows the FD to avoid using an inappropriate
and unproven disease diagnosis which does not yet fit,
thus keeping disease classes ‘clean’.4,5 Symptom diagno-
ses, by their nature, reflect the patient’s request for
care. They are very often based on the symptom the
patient presented in the first place (e.g. an RfE
of ‘cough’ resulting in a symptom diagnosis of cough).
Documenting them as such prevents patients from
being prematurely or incorrectly labelled with an
uncertain diagnosis, potentially preventing harm by
preventing unnecessary anxiety or inappropriate inter-
ventions. In this manner, diagnoses are thus not made
beyond the appropriate level of certainty. In our ex-
ample, it is appropriate to conclude, at the start of
the episode of care, that the patient suffers from stom-
ach pain, but not to define a disease-label diagnosis.
The symptom diagnosis stomach pain is sufficient to
guide appropriate symptomatic treatment and further
investigations.
The category of symptom diagnoses in ICPC also
encompasses a large variety of concerns and problems,
which may lead patients to consult their FD, such
as fear of a disease (e.g. cancer, sexually transmitted
disease) or inability to perform certain ‘common’
functions, regardless of the existence of a disease that
might justify that fear or explain that loss of function.
Symptom diagnoses include rubrics for patients’ mood
and feelings (nervous, anxious, tense and sad) and 29
codes allow for coding the social problems that people
may be struggling with.4,5
Over the years, the concept of symptom diagnosis as
classified within ICPC has given rise to both misunder-
standing and criticism. One misunderstanding is that
a symptom diagnosis should be used for describing
‘mild cases’.56 On the contrary, a symptom diagnosis
in ICPC has no implied indication whatsoever of the
severity of the symptom. Headache is headache, re-
gardless of the severity. This is true for all diagnoses
in ICPC: psoriasis is called psoriasis, be it a patient
with a small spot on the left elbow or one so severely
affected as to require cytotoxic chemotherapy.4,5
The developers of ICPC, Lamberts and Wood, re-
ported a reaction of one of their FD colleagues as an
example of this criticism:
I find it personally objectionable to ask the patient
why he has come to see me and then diagnose his
problem in the form of a symptom diagnosis. I
have not spent most of my adult life in medicine
to be diminished in this way. I can diagnose any
symptom or complaint of my patients with
a proper disease label.6
Even though the latter claim is undeniably false, its
source reflects an understandable conundrum. What
kind of a profession would FM be if it had nothing to
contribute to a presented problem? The answer is that
by providing ‘only’ a symptom diagnosis, actually a very
real and very professional contribution has been made:
the professional assessment that, after the completion
of the doctor–patient encounter and after considering
everything the patient has told or shown, the only cer-
tain diagnosis applicable is a symptom diagnosis. Based
on that diagnosis, symptomatic treatment and watchful
waiting may be the most appropriate action, and
TABLE 1 The relation between the patient’s request for an intervention and the intervention occurring and vice versa. Source: Okkes et al11
Intervention
(ICPC code)
Presented as RfE
(per 1000 patient
years and N); % of
request met
Intervention performed
(per 1000 patient
years and N); %
requested as an RfE
Physical exam (*31) 562 (n = 112 967); 53 2593 (n = 521 577); 18
Blood test (*34) 91 (n = 18 384); 58 254 (n = 51 062); 26
Radiology/imaging (*41) 10 (n = 1992); 45 100 (n = 20 144); 6
Advice (*45) 129 (n = 26 036); 49 1230 (n = 247 345); 13
Prescription (*50) 380 (n = 76378); 79 1601 (n= 323 040); 20
Counselling (*58) 19 (n = 3881); 63 83 (n = 16 667); 19
Referral primary care (*66) 24 (n = 4809); 56 140 (n = 28 090); 12
Referral secondary care (*67) 31 (n = 6140); 48 201 (n = 40 518); 10
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invasive procedures or potentially toxic medication may
be appropriately avoided. It is not an easy or trivial
choice but rather a scientific and important process
with a hard measurable outcome.
MUS and somatization
We found a substantial body of literature on medi-
cally unexplained (physical) symptoms (MUS or
MUPS).56–104 The argument underlying ‘MUS’ as
a concept is the existence of a substantial proportion
of patients who present, sometimes over an extended
period of time, with physical complaints, which are
not attributable to a specific disease entity. This has
led to the hypothesis that such people have underlying
psychological/social/psychiatric problems, which mani-
fest physical symptoms.
In the 20th century, this phenomenon was termed
‘somatization’, and in severe cases, ‘somatization
disorder’, and doctors were urged to prevent people
from pursuing such dysfunctional consulting
behaviour.57,59,65,66,69,73 Recent years have shown a re-
vival of the debate on somatization, now in the guise of
MUS. To a large extent, the same fundamental observa-
tions and ideas underpin the recent literature on MUS.
In the same way that existing syndromes such as ‘CFS’
(Chronic Fatigue Syndrome), ‘IBS’ (Irritable Bowel
Syndrome) and ‘fibromyalgia’ have overlapping diag-
nostic criteria, similarly the concept of MUS is an exten-
sion of the argument that such symptoms might usefully
be lumped together.57–63 In this way, complaints that
formerly had been lumped into a number of different
syndromes are now lumped into an even larger ‘super’
syndrome, with the common characteristic of not being
explained by one or more specific medical diagnoses.
Research on and into MUS has developed a broad
range of expert opinions, unresolved questions and
open criticism of both doctors and patients.57–59 The
concept of MUS is rather imprecisely defined, and this
is evidenced in the literature. Articles often open with
the argument that MUS is a frequent problem for both
primary and secondary care doctors. However, the
prevalence figures differ considerably: ‘play a major
role’,75,84 ‘a large number’,65 ‘common’,58,60,66,67 ‘on
average 13%’,73 ‘16.1%’,89 ‘10–20%’,69 ‘20%’,68
‘19.7–22%’,99 ‘15–30%’,98 ‘one-third’,71,72 ‘at least
one-third’,70 ‘20–50%’,57 ‘25–50%’,64 approximately
one-quarter to one-half’74 and ‘25–75%’.59
Interestingly, whereas authors agree that MUS as a di-
agnostic entity ‘exists’, there is quite some debate about
its nature. During a recent workshop of the World Or-
ganization of Family Doctors (Wonca), ‘almost half
(48%) of the audience agreed that the most important
problem is that MUS[s] are not clearly defined’.64 In-
deed, many papers struggle with defining MUS, both
against ‘non-MUS’ and against other syndromes (CFS,
depression and anxiety).58–63,65,70,71,74,77,78,83,86,93,96,98,99
In commenting on these problems of definition, Aron
and Buchwald62 state that one of the main problems in
diagnosing MUS is that it ‘relies heavily on subjective
symptoms and typically not on objective clinical or lab-
oratory findings, which are currently sparse’. This view
is echoed by Smith and Dwamena59, who propose to
find severe cases of MUS ‘through laboratory evalua-
tion to exclude organic disease’. In other words, the
proponents of MUS defend the concept as a collection
of all that cannot be defined and categorized in medi-
cine and point to the subjectivity of all that patients feel
as the root cause of this uncertainty.
Ironically, MUS as a concept does little to reduce
diagnostic uncertainty. In fact, the literature seems to
indicate that MUS is often considered to be at risk for
being ‘missed’ as a diagnosis. Some studies found that
physicians ‘miss’ the diagnosis at its first presenta-
tion57,59,65,69,94 and noted that ‘the under-diagnosis of
MUP[S] is similar to the rate of unrecognized psychiat-
ric disorders reported by others’. Furthermore, doctors
are criticized both for performing too many physical ex-
aminations (whether or not under pressure)62 and for
refraining to perform tests in order to more objectively
define cases.59 Some papers mention a lack of FD train-
ing as a factor, associated with inadequate diagnosis
and treatment for MUS patients.57,59
On this basis, it very well could be concluded that
much of this reported diagnostic and therapeutic confu-
sion is due to the fact that entities, which should not be
lumped together, were indeed lumped together into
a category called MUS that, subsequently, is problem-
atic. This inappropriate categorization of health prob-
lems into purely physical (non-MUS) and purely non-
physical (i.e. psychological, including MUS and other
syndromes) diseases is a 16th century concept, which is
an inappropriate reduction in the post-modern world.
There is no mind–body dichotomy in the real world.
Consequently, the diagnosis of MUS does not cater for
complexity and uncertainty in the practice of medicine
and is incompatible with the widely recognized biologi-
cal, social and psychological model of disease.108,109 In
turn, it is in conflict with the holistic approach to the
practice of FM included as a core competence of FDs
by Wonca.105
No doctor could rationally decide at the first presen-
tation that a symptom cannot have a medical explana-
tion and is therefore medically unexplained. Doctors
are no clairvoyants, and many diagnostic entities need
time and/or tests to be verified or falsified. In many
cases, the diagnosis is made on the basis of probabilities
based on prior experience or knowledge in turn or
through a process of analysis where various hypotheses
are made, weighed on the basis of likelihoods (defined
on the basis of presenting symptoms, signs and test re-
sults) and accepted or rejected again in consideration
of probabilities and not certainties.106
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The idea that patients presenting with MUS share
a common latent variable is, to say the least, quite
doctor-centred. It implies that medicine should, and
can, explain everything with strong degrees of certainty
and that patients’ suffering necessarily needs a defined
medical explanation in order to be legitimized.
Other perspectives on symptoms in the
literature
The debate, or even controversy, on how FDs concep-
tualize patients’ presenting symptoms, has involved
other authors and differing perspectives.
In a thoughtful essay, Aronowitz describes how pa-
tients’ sufferings became ‘clinical orphans’ because of
the shift from accepting symptoms as a diagnosis to-
wards recognizing only diagnoses based on physiology
or anatomy.110 In that context, it should be of no sur-
prise that the suffering of people can be only imper-
fectly matched to a set of ‘objective’ disease
categories. Patients feel what they feel, independent
of any medical model.
It is a well-known fact that people quite often suffer
from symptoms, for which they may seek care but do
not do so to a very large proportion. White et al., in
1962, and Green et al., in 2001, reported surprisingly
similar estimates of the proportion of people experienc-
ing symptoms and seeking or not seeking care.111,112
Over a period of 1 month, 750 and 800, respectively,
of 1000 US persons experienced symptoms. Both stud-
ies found that 25% consulted a doctor, indicating
that many people decide not to present their symp-
toms to a medical professional.
However, we found little empirical research on
symptoms in FM, despite papers calling for more such
research. Although a number of studies used the inter-
national standard approach of ICPC and the RfE, a sig-
nificant proportion (possibly even in growth) continues
to reduce symptoms to the super-category MUS. The
latter contribute little to further understanding the pa-
tient’s perspective and the diagnostic process in FM.
RfEs and symptom diagnoses in contrast
to MUS
Both authors concur that the RfE and symptom diag-
noses are a superior reduction to MUS for under-
standing the patient’s perspective in FM on the basis
of the literature reviewed. They are also demonstrably
superior in understanding the process of diagnosis in
FM.2,3,9
Using the reduction, MUS implies that many, or even
all, symptoms are medically ‘explainable’. In this sense,
the concept presents quite an arrogant and doctor-
centred point of view, which is not supported by
published evidence. Actually, in this context, it is impor-
tant to understand that most symptoms are medically
unexplained. For example, we know that thirst as a symp-
tom can be explained by the presence of diabetes. But
not everyone with diabetes is thirsty, not everyone who
is thirsty has diabetes, not everyone with sinusitis has
a headache, and the disease ‘depression’ leads some peo-
ple to gain and others to lose weight. Doctors cannot re-
liably explain why a duodenal ulcer in one person may
present with heartburn alone but in others with com-
plaints such as localized abdominal pain, vomiting, bloat-
ing and a lack of appetite. At least in this sense, MUS
and complaints are a far larger group than those catego-
rized as such by the exponents of the MUS syndrome.
Why should, or even why would, everything be medi-
cally explainable? Why do we feel happy or unhappy?
Why do we like salmon (or not)? Why do we fall in
(and out of) love? Why do we experience butterflies in
our stomach? And what is more: what would we gain if
every possible symptom were medically explainable?
The symptom diagnosis as a concept reflects the ap-
plication of the scientific method to describing the
fundamental medical truth that, on the one hand, one
complaint often fits more than one diagnosis, and, on
the other hand, most diagnoses are based on the pre-
sentation of a number of symptoms and complaints that
do not necessarily have to all occur simultaneously. The
construction of a medical diagnosis represents patho-
physiological but also psychological and social factors.39
A classification which includes symptoms, as well as dis-
orders, as diagnostic labels allows the practitioner to
prospectively document health problems as episodes of
care developing over time, including modifications in
the diagnosis as it becomes more defined. This is clearly
an essential requirement for primary care doctors with
a responsibility for the large majority of their patients’
personal health care needs, including poorly defined
problems that defy accurate medical categorization,
especially at first presentation, as well as autonomic sys-
tem dysfunction and functional illnesses that neverthe-
less cause patient suffering and are perfectly legitimate
reasons to seek medical care per se.113 FM needs a sys-
tem such as ICPC to accurately document all health
problems in all stages of development. Often, a problem
resolves itself after one encounter with the doctor1–3
and simply requires reassurance and symptomatic treat-
ment for the cough, headache, back pain, anxiety, ab-
dominal pain, etc. Medicalization of such symptoms
is inappropriate and could harm the patient through
unnecessary intervention or anxiety.
ICPC does not cater for coding mind–body meta-
phors and thus does not allow the coding of ‘psychoso-
matic’ disease unless this fits strict and well-defined
criteria.4,5 This is the appropriate approach of FDs
and psychiatrists to mental problems, fully in line with
the definitions and diagnostic method of the Diagnos-
tic Statistical Manual IV (DSM-IV), itself in turn
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a standard for diagnosing psychiatric disease.113 This
does not imply that emotions, psychological and social
factors are not considered important elements in the
development, and individual experience, of somatic
complaints. On the contrary, however, as yet there is
not an accepted and defined causal pathogenic path-
way for this phenomenon, let alone an explanation of
why this should happen in some, but not all, patients.
Symptoms should thus be accepted at face value and
not labelled as ‘physical’ or ‘psychological’ or even
‘social’, although these elements may be contributing
to a lesser or greater degree.
Therefore, in that sense, there is no scientific reason
to propose the diagnosis of MUS because that would
replace well-defined symptom diagnoses, which are not
thereby better explained. This new ‘umbrella’ diagnosis
is, in fact, in that same sense not explained either.
‘Heartburn’ as a symptom diagnosis is no better defined
or explained as ‘medically unexplained heartburn’ and
even less so when lumped into a category along with
other symptom diagnoses as a label of ‘MUS’ applied
to a patient who suffers from heartburn.
In cases where the diagnostic threshold is reached,
the diagnosis of somatization disorder applies and the
appropriate management is justified but not by de-
fault.113 In fact, the prediction that most MUS are due
to psychosomatic conditions has not only failed to be
proven but also has been proven to be untrue. There-
fore, the suggestion that such symptoms are psycho-
genic, found in the introduction of many MUS papers,
has been thoroughly researched and found to be incor-
rect, in the sense that most studies have found that only
a small minority of MUS patients fit the diagnostic cri-
teria for somatization disorder.57,59 Nevertheless, more
studies seem to attempt to study the same phenomenon
again, as if to find different results and disprove previ-
ous research. This is not research in evolution but
rather research into a philosophical dead end.
In reviewing the current literature, in fact, it appeared
evident that it is highly unlikely that MUS is in any way
a homogeneous group. We have shown that the content
of international FM is better demonstrated through
studying associations between RFEs and diagnoses than
it is by studying the incidence and prevalence of dis-
ease;1–3 therefore, any attempt to explain away patients’
symptoms through the MUS reduction basically makes
FM data more difficult to understand. Years of research
into MUS as a clinical entity has failed to produce an in-
ternational body of knowledge, or an effective clinical
approach or method, and has rather failed to support
the philosophy on which the reduction itself is based.
This literature reports the frustration of doctors with
MUS and also reflects the frustration of researchers
with defining the concept itself in a clinically useful
manner. None of the studies reliably predict outcomes
in an individual patient, except for the poor outcomes
of persistent frequent attendees.56–59
The medical model is an imperfect reduction for the
complex doctor–patient encounters which occur in FM.
A new model based on a new paradigm is needed, such
as the ‘biopsychosocial’ model. The biological, psycho-
logical and social model of illness and disease proposed
by Engel is embraced by many FDs as an appropriate
model, but it has no place in the MUS philosophy, and
this represents a fatal flaw.108
As a super-syndrome, neither does MUS fit the
medical paradigm. It is an anomaly of the theoretical
framework, which can only be addressed by funda-
mentally changing the medical paradigm itself. Such
a paradigm shift has been called for many years and
is certainly addressed in many ways by the funda-
mental concepts within ICPC, such as the RfE and
the symptom diagnosis. That model should fully em-
brace the patient perspective, embrace biological, psy-
chological and social elements in the process of
diagnosis and care, represent a real shift to patient-
centred care and will surely be consistent with the con-
cepts reflected within ICPC and the RfE. It cannot
include inappropriate reductions such as MUS.
Discussion
This review has found two conflicting approaches to the
role of symptoms in medicine and especially FM. ICPC
contains >200 codes for symptoms and complaints
which may be used for coding RfEs empirically as they
present to the FD. Additionally, RfEs can be expressed
as disease labels and requests for interventions and
coded as such. These rubrics appear to greatly enhance
the clinical reliability and relevance of patient docu-
mentation and play a major role in estimating probabil-
ities for diagnoses in standard sex/age groups.6–9,11,12 In
principle, codes for diagnoses, symptoms and com-
plaints from another coding system such as Read or
Snomed could also be used to code RfEs. However,
ICPC is a superior tool for this purpose, having been
designed for primary care and for coding RfEs.9
An important aspect of ICPC is that somatoform au-
tonomic dysfunction and persistent somatoform pain
are not diagnosed as such but only in the form of a
physical symptom diagnosis without a ‘psychogenic’
connotation. This avoids the subjective labelling of such
symptoms as non-organic by the FD and avoids judge-
mental and potentially demeaning labels for patients’
suffering. It is a scientific approach, based on the biop-
sychosocial concept of disease and illness. In DSM-IV,
unexplained somatic complaints associated with fre-
quent health care visits are also insufficient criteria to
formally diagnose somatization disorder.113 Again, ICPC
provides ample potential to code somatic symptom diag-
noses as such without the need to diagnose a ‘subthresh-
old’ somatization disorder.
Diagnostic labels often have the disadvantage of rel-
ative uncertainty, caused by the more-or-less arbitrary
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attribution of different symptom and sign clusters to
a disease diagnosis (e.g., syndrome diagnoses, psychi-
atric diagnoses). Symptoms and complaints on the
other hand have the advantage of relative certainty
since they represent the patient’s experience of ill
health irrespective of the diagnostic label.
In the daily work of FDs, the importance of the ab-
sence or presence of a symptom must be considered
in light of the distribution of disease in the family
practice setting. Recording the patient’s RfE with
ICPC makes available data from the diagnostic process
in FM. The availability of age-specific prior probabili-
ties of common symptoms and complaints for diagnoses
in family practice, therefore, has great potential.2,3,9
Such data would not only seem to be crucial for the
further development of family practice as an academic
discipline, and for the design of intervention studies,
but also has direct practical consequences for clinicians.
Years of research into MUS have failed to support an
international body of knowledge and cannot convinc-
ingly support the philosophy on which the reduction
itself is based. The study of MUS has also failed to pro-
vide insights in diagnostic decisions in FM and therefore
has severely limited application in clinical practice.
Conclusions
This review supports the value of researching RfEs
without artificial mind–body metaphors, and the re-
lated research project shows that diagnostic odds ra-
tios for RfEs in an episode of care are similar
between populations in different countries.2 Applying
the medical model strictly, by using the approach de-
fined by the literature on MUS, is shown to be a failing
reduction of the domain of FM. As such, a new model
based on a
substantial paradigm shift is needed. That model
should be the biopsychosocial model and should be
based on the philosophical concepts reflected in ICPC,
especially the RfE.
There is more to life than medicine may diagnose,
and FM should strive to move closer to the world of
our patients than the medical model alone would allow.
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